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1. Introduction
About 60% of the Southern African region is semi-arid or arid and suffers from periodic
droughts [1]. This is compounded by the scarcity and poor management of irrigation water
resources. The challenges of water scarcity for agricultural purposes present negative conse‐
quences on the general populace, more particularly in the rural areas. It is in these areas that
the majority practise agriculture for their livelihoods with regards to food and incomes [2].
This has led to a decline in agricultural productivity. Declining agricultural productivity
among smallholder farmers in Africa remains a major bottleneck in the development of the
continent [3]. Agricultural production is dominated by rain-fed agriculture and irrigation
systems are limited [4].
To this effect, management of agricultural water particularly in rain-fed systems remains
imperative for improved farm level yields because the bulk of the food comes from rain-fed
agriculture [2, 3]. Yet, evidence of the problems of water management is found throughout
history [5]. Effective management of agricultural water requires continuous backup from
policies and institutional frameworks [2, 3, 6]. Scholars have argued that institutions are very
important to improve management problems [7, 8]. How to incorporate and sustain institu‐
tional innovations to ensure efficient use and management of irrigation water under diverse
ecological, economic, social, and political constraints is an on-going debate on irrigation water
resource development [9]. Efficient use and management of irrigation water require changes
in institutions and new institutions [10].
In light of the above, a series of institutional arrangements have been presented as panaceas
to improve water management: strong government agencies, user organizations, and water
markets [5]. These approaches have conversely failed to achieve the required outcomes
basically because of the variability of local situations and the difficulty associated with
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transferring institutions from one context to another were not considered [5]. Moreover,
research has confirmed that lack of enabling policies and effective institutional frameworks
are a major contributor towards poor management and utilisation of agricultural water in Sub-
Saharan Africa [3, 6].
In light of the above, it is therefore important to understand that addressing the challenges
that are associated with water management, there is need to consider the localised rules and
norms and the authorities that therefore enforce them. This is over and above implementing
appropriate and relevant technologies [11]. Therefore, there is need for instituting effective
localised governance the effective application of community rules. Thus, this chapter seeks to
investigate the nature and role of water management institutions to foster sustainable agri‐
cultural water resources management, particularly in Zimbabwe after the “fast” track land
reform programme. The subsequent section discusses the major water reforms in Zimbabwe.
1.1. Redressing past water injustices in Zimbabwe
For close to two decades after independence water resource management continued to be
governed by the 1976 Water Act. The need for water reform eventually emanated from the
need to ‘redress colonial injustices in the water sector’ [12, 13, 14]. Increased continual
privileged access to water by the white large-scale commercial agriculture for commercial
interests called for an urgent need to reform the irrigation water sector in Zimbabwe. This was
to be augmented by establishing a legal framework that would also guarantee an equal access
to water for all Zimbabweans. Ensuring equitable access to water for rural people for produc‐
tive uses contributes to the improvement of their livelihoods derived from the use of water.
The water reforms that culminated in the 1998 Water Act began as a reaction to the 1991/92
drought, the worst in the country’s history [15]. Within this context, the 1976 Water Act was
repealed by the 1998 Water Act and the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) Act.
The Water Act of 1998 set the parameters of access and use of water as well as the establishment
of Catchment and Sub-catchment areas based on hydrological boundaries.
1.2. Institutions: Nature and role
This chapter adopts a definition of institutions that encompasses both [16] and [17]. [17]’s
definition implies that interactions with the environment are secondary to political, economic
and social interactions whereas [16] notes that institutions are rules that can be used at multiple
levels of analysis and such a definition does not seem to place priority of one factor over
another. The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing
structure to human interaction [18].
The difference between formal and informal institutions is one of degree, not of kind, and in
many cases some informal institutions gradually become part of their formal counterparts and
some formal institutions take informal forms. Informal institutions are also considered
extensions and local-level translations of formal institutions and are not purposively designed
but evolve through spontaneous interaction, whereas formal institutions can be purposively
designed [18, 19].
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2. Effectiveness of institutions: A critical review
2.1. Formal institutions
A survey was conducted by [20] based on a technical and institutional evaluation of the Geray
irrigation scheme in West Gojjam zone, Amhara region, Ethiopia. The results indicate that the
scheme had been managed by the Water Users Association for four years, despite the fact that
it had existed for 27 years. The overall performance of the Water Users Association in terms
of managing the schemes was very poor. Water Users Association had no legal authority to
enforce its by-laws.
In Harayana, India, [21] employed descriptive analysis to argue that the fact that the poorer
households participated in water projects, this did not however, protect their interests.
Community based organisations did not basically provide efficient irrigation services com‐
pared to the services provided by private organisations. Allocation of water, collection of
irrigation service fees, and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure by contractors was more
effective than by the community. In contrast, an almost similar study by [22] evaluated the
performance of smallholder irrigation systems in Zimbabwe. The results showed that the
farmer managed irrigation system performed better consistently than the government
managed irrigation system.
In Sri Lanka, a study by [23] revealed that there were many problems in agency managed
irrigation. Poor maintenance of irrigation facilities under public provision is a salient feature
in many countries. There was heavy subsidisation of the irrigation management in Sri Lanka
which had a poor record of cost recovery. Less than 50 percent of the maintenance costs have
been collected from farmers at any time [24]. Similarly, as observed by [25], another major
deficiency has been the pricing policies in irrigation. Pricing is not related to scarcity or the
cost of delivery. Flat rate pricing means the marginal cost is zero which created inefficiency in
water use.
2.2. Informal institutions
Several studies have acknowledged the fact that informal local level institutions can make a
difference in water management [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. However, the majority of practi‐
tioners and policy-makers advocate for the formal state-based water rights in water manage‐
ment issues, while avoiding consideration of the localised informal norms and rules. On the
other hand, the researchers who were pro-informal arrangements seem not to put their support
on advocating for adoption of the localised best practices, rather, they opt for amalgamation
of the (new) formal and (existing) informal arrangements. However, acknowledging the local
rules and norms as legitimate by the formal law, the way they are implemented will suppress
the dynamics that are fundamental of local arrangements and thus negatively affects local
rights, hence poor irrigation water management.
In efforts to fully understand the importance of informal rules, [33] examined gender issues
and women’s participation in irrigated agriculture in Carchi, Ecuador, using a combination of
qualitative and quantitative methods of analyses. The findings showed that women’s partici‐
pation in water user associations is low, and culture plays a strong role in terms of their
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decision-making power. In addition, women tried to solve their irrigation-related problems
through informal ways where they had more decision making power.
3. Conceptional framework: Institutional Decomposition Analysis (IDA)
In this study, and as employed by [34], the Institutional Decomposition Analysis (IDA) for
measuring the effectiveness of water management institutions was decomposed into informal
and formal institutions components. The later was further decomposed into three institutional
components; irrigation water law, irrigation water policy, and irrigation water administration. The
institutional facets were decomposed further to identify their institutional aspects (Figure 1).
This framework provides a basis for a quantitative evaluation of both the institutional and the
institution performance linkages.
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework
Irrigation and Drainage - Sustainable Strategies and Systems4
4. Methodology
4.1. Model specification
The dependent variable, effectiveness of the relevant formal and informal institution compo‐
nents, were assessed based on a ten-point Likert scale, 1 signifying an extremely non-effective
institution and 10 signifying an extremely formal institution. A value of five implied an
undecided or a neutral perception. The following set of equations describes the functional
relationships of the formal irrigation institutions.
( ), , ,=        Effectiveness of IWMI function LOIWL POIWP AOIWA INFWI
The equation is based on the conceptual framework shown in figure 1
The definitions of the independent variables are listed in Figure 1 and Tables 1 - 4. The variables
are grouped into categories of:
• Dummy variables. The value of 1 indicates the existence of a given institutional aspect; zero
otherwise.
• Scale variables. A numerical value of 0 -10 is assigned for each category. A value of zero
indicates the worst situation and 10 indicates an ideal situation. The intermediate values
taken by the scale variables can be interpreted as the extent the actual situation deviates
from either the worst or the ideal situation.
When these equations are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the sign and size of
their coefficients provide insights into the relative role that various institutional aspects play
in influencing the performance of the formal irrigation water institutions.
Explanatory Variable Acronym Data type Variable evaluation criteria
Access to water rights LAWR Dummy 1 = yes; 0 = otherwise
Format of water rights LFWR Dummy
0 = no rights;
1 = unclear/scattered rights;
2 = common state property;
3 = riparian system;
4 = correlative (proportional) sharing;
5 = licenses/permits
Awareness of the existence of irrigation
water law LEWL Dummy
1 = yes;
0 = otherwise
Provisions effective for conflict
resolution mechanisms LCRM Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception;
scale of 0 – 10
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Explanatory Variable Acronym Data type Variable evaluation criteria
Water law relevant for irrigation water
users under current and future
situation
LRCF Scale Captured in terms of judgemental perception;scale of 0 - 10
Relationship of water law with other
laws to promote irrigation water
management
LLOL Scale Captured in terms of judgemental perception;scale of 0 - 10
Water law provisions to promote
private sector participation LPPS Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception;
scale of 0 – 10
Table 1. Irrigation water law component (LOIWL) with explanatory variable evaluation criteria
Explanatory variable Acronym Data type Variable evaluation criteria
Irrigation project selection criterion is
economic-oriented PPSC Dummy
1 = yes
0 = otherwise
Pay for use of irrigation water PUIW Dummy 1 = yes0 = otherwise
Form in which irrigation water if paid
for PFIP Dummy
0 = full subsidy (no payment)
1 = partial recovery
2 = full-cost recovery
Impact of the policy for promoting
private sector participation PGPP Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception on
a scale of 0 – 10
Extensiveness of private sector
participation in irrigation water
management
PEPP Scale Captured in terms of judgemental perception;scale of 0 – 10
Organised into Water Users
Associations (WUAs) PWUA Dummy
1 = yes
0 = otherwise
Extensiveness of WUAs’ participation
in irrigation water management PEWA Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception;
scale of 0 – 10
Impact of the policy for promoting
users’ participation PIUP Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception;
scale of 0 – 10
Extent of influence of other policies* on
irrigation water policy PEOP Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception;
scale of 0 - 10
Extent of linkages between irrigation
water law and irrigation water policy PWPL Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception;
scale of 0 - 10
Some of these policies to be considered include: fiscal policies, economic policies, investment policies, etc
Table 2. Irrigation water policy component (POIMP) and independent variable evaluation criteria
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Explanatory variable Acronym Data type Variable evaluation criteria
Capacity of the administration of
irrigation water at scheme level ACIW Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception;
scale of 0 – 10
Effectiveness of user groups (WUAs) in
administration of irrigation water AEWA Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception;
scale of 0 – 10
Private sector participation reduces
administrative & management burden APPA Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception;
scale of 0 – 10
Mechanisms of collecting update and
do maintenance at scheme level AMUM Dummy
1 = yes
0 = otherwise
Adequacy, relevance, reliability of
water data in irrigation water
management at scheme level
AARR Scale Captured in terms of judgemental perception;scale of 0 – 10
Capacity to administer irrigation water
through use of the irrigation water law
and policy
ACLP Scale Captured in terms of judgemental perception;scale of 0 – 10
Table 3. Irrigation water administration component (AOIWA) and variable evaluation criteria
Explanatory variable Acronym Data type Variable evaluation criteria
Clearly defined boundaries to
withdraw irrigation water CPRs ICPR Dummy
1 = existing;
0 = otherwise
Existing appropriation rules related to
the local conditions IARL Dummy
1 = existing;
0 = otherwise
Existing mechanisms, e.g. constitutions
to assist in irrigation water
management
IMSL Dummy 1 = existing;0 = otherwise
Effectiveness of management
mechanisms in water management IEMM Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception on
a scale of 0 – 10
Effectiveness of monitoring, conditions
and the behaviour of appropriators IEMA Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception on
a scale of 0 – 10
Existence of regulation sanctions for
users who fail to act accordingly IERS Dummy
1 = existing;
0 = otherwise
Existence of rapid access to conflict
solving in the low-cost, local setting IECS Dummy
1 = existing;
0 = otherwise
Users challenging rights of
appropriators to create own local-based
institutions
ICRA Dummy Captured in terms of judgemental perception ona scale of 0 – 10
Extent of challenge of the rights of
appropriators to create own institutions IECA Scale
Captured in terms of judgemental perception on
a scale of 0 – 10
Effectiveness of informal institutions to
influence law, policy and
administration
IOEI Scale Captured in terms of judgemental perception ona scale of 0 – 10
Table 4. Informal irrigation water management institutions and variable evaluation criteria
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4.2. Data collection
The research study was carried-out in Mashonaland East Province, Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is
divided into five broad Natural Regions (NR) in which the dominant natural factor condi‐
tioning agricultural production is climate; mainly rainfall.
Stratified sampling was done to categorise irrigation schemes into the three strata:
• A1 landless people;
• A2, commercial settlement schemes - small, medium, and large scale; and lastly
• Communal/resettled farmers.
From each stratum, random sampling was done to select the target irrigation schemes1 in the
province. The sample population for the study is depicted in Table 5. A total of 120 question‐
naires were administered. The key instrument for data collection was a structured question‐
naire which solicited both qualitative and quantitative data.
Type of ownership Number of schemes targeted
A1* irrigation schemes 36
A2 irrigation schemes 43
Communal/resettled irrigation schemes 41
Total questionnaires 120
*Schemes under A1 category and collectively operated
Table 5. Stratification of the study population
5. Descriptive results
The descriptive results are summarized in Tables 6 – 9.
Irrigation water law
variables Acronyms
Type of
data
Mean
values
Standard
Deviation
Range
Min Max
Access to water rights LAWR Dummy 0.371 0.236 0 1
Format of water rights LFWR Dummy 1.340 0.117 0 5
Existence of irrigation water
law LEWL Dummy 0.313 0.461 0 1
1 For a scheme to be selected for the study, it should have been functional for at least the past 5 years and at the time of
the interview.
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Irrigation water law
variables Acronyms
Type of
data
Mean
values
Standard
Deviation
Range
Min Max
Provisions effective for
solving conflicts among
irrigation water users
LCRM Scale 3.641 3.314 0 10
Water law relevant for
irrigation water users under
current and future situation
LRCF Scale 2.414 1.423 0 10
Irrigation water law
relationship with other laws
to promote water
management
LLOL Scale 4.341 2.532 0 10
Water law provisions to
promote private sector
participation
LSPS Scale 5.266 2.160 0 10
Source: survey data
Table 6. Descriptive statistics: perceptional -based legal, institutional, and performance variables
Irrigation water law
variables Acronyms
Type of
data
Mean
values
Standard
Deviation
Range
Min Max
Project selection criterion is
economic-oriented PPSC Dummy 0.214 0.428 0 1
Pay for use of irrigation
water PUIW Dummy 0.384 0.413 0 1
Form in which irrigation
water is paid PFIP Dummy 1.361 0.381 0 2
Polices favourable for
promoting private sector
participation
PGPP Scale 3.148 3.861 0 10
Extensiveness of private
sector participation PEPP Scale 3.266 2.184 0 10
Organised into Water Users
Association (WUA) PWUA Dummy 0.318 0.426 0 1
Extensiveness of WUAs
participation PEWA Scale 2.048 0.176 0 10
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Irrigation water law
variables Acronyms
Type of
data
Mean
values
Standard
Deviation
Range
Min Max
Policies favourable for users
participation PGUP Scale 3.648 2.481 0 10
Effect of other polices like
fiscal and economic policies PEOP Scale 6.516 2.662 0 10
Water policy links well with
water law PWPL Scale 2.018 0.748 0 10
Source: survey data
Table 7. Descriptive statistics: perceptional-based policy institutional and performance variables
Irrigation water law variables Acronyms Type ofdata
Mean
values
Standard
Deviation
Range
Min Max
Capacity of the administration of
irrigation water at scheme level ACIW Scale 6.162 2.242 0 10
Effectiveness of user groups or
WUAs in administration of irrigation
water
AEWA Scale 4.733 2.149 0 10
Private sector participation reduces
burden on irrigation water
administration and management
APPA Scale 5.147 1.240 0 10
Mechanisms of collecting updates
and do maintenance of irrigation
water at scheme level
AMUM Dummy 0.234 0.108 0 1
Adequacy, relevance and reliability
of water data in irrigation water
management at scheme level
AARR Scale 3.624 2.813 0 10
Capacity to effectively administer
irrigation water through use of the
irrigation water law and policy
ACLP Scale 3.162 2.198 0 10
Source: survey data (2012)
Table 8. Perceptional-based administration institutional and performance variables
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Informal irrigation water
institution variables Acronyms
Type of
data
Mean
values
Standard
Deviation
Range
Min Max
Clearly defined boundaries to
withdraw irrigation water from
Common Pool Resources (CPRs)
ICPR Dummy 0.314 0.238 0 1
Existing appropriation rules related
to the local conditions IARL Dummy 0.421 0.162 0 1
Mechanisms, e.g. constitutions to
assist in irrigation water
management at scheme level
IMSL Dummy 0.204 0.191 0 1
Effectiveness of management
mechanisms in water management IEMM Scale 4.184 3.005 0 10
Effectiveness of monitoring
conditions and the behaviour of
appropriators at scheme level
IEMA Scale 3.881 2.748 0 10
Existence of regulation sanctions at
scheme level for users who fail to act
accordingly
IERS Dummy 0.508 0.263 0 1
Existence of rapid access to conflict
solving in the low-cost, local setting IECS Dummy 0.381 0.024 0 1
Users challenging the rights of
appropriators to create own local-
based institutions suited to own local
set-up
ICRA Dummy 0.215 0.138 0 1
Extent of challenge of the rights of
appropriators to create own
institution based on diverse local set-
ups
IECA Scale 3.587 2.782 0 10
Effectiveness of informal institutions
to influence the irrigation water law,
policy and administration
IOEI Scale 4.499 1.033 0 10
Source: survey data (2012)
Table 9. Perceptional-based informal water institution and performance variables.
5.1. Formal institutions
5.1.1. Legal variables
Water rights are mechanisms through which a user can access water for a particular use
without jeopardising another user’s right [35]. The descriptive statistics reveal that most users
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had little or no access to water rights (mean value = 0.37). During the colonial history of
Zimbabwe, black indigenous farmers were disadvantaged because they had not applied for
water rights [36] and when they applied for water rights, most of the water was committed to
rights held by white farmers, which were issued in perpetuity and could not be revoked.
Smallholder farmers were also disenfranchised because the legal systems introduced in the
colonial and post-colonial states failed to acknowledge traditional water management
practices [37]. In addition, [38] also report that the water rights of the indigenous population
which predated the settler claims, were disregarded, thus leaving most farmers without water
rights. Farmers’ rights are found to be unclear/scattered or absent as shown by a mean value
of 1.34, skewed towards the worst situation. Lack of clearly defined and well-enforced property
rights significantly increase risks [39]. Unclear rights increase risks of farmers mismanaging
water resources because they do not have a sense of ownership.
A mean value of 0.31 for the awareness of the existence of water law suggests that most users
are not fully aware of the existence of the water law. The “Fast-Track Land Reform Pro‐
gramme” (FTLRP) brought in producers who may not have been aware of the existence of the
water law. Human actors have bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) rather than perfect knowl‐
edge. Human actors lack complete knowledge to assess their decision alternatives due to their
cognitive limitations, time and information constraints [40, 41].
There were weak provisions for conflict-solving within the water law (mean value = 3.64),
suggesting that users may seek arbitration from legal courts. However, formal courts tend to
nullify the rulings of informal arbitration [41]. This may imply perpetuation of conflict,
eventually leading to poor irrigation water management.
The results reveal an irrelevant irrigation water law for current and future users (mean value
= 2.41). This result can imply a lack of enforcement of the 1998 Water Act, despite the Act being
regarded as technically sound, with a solid base for sustainable and efficient utilisation of water
resources. Vital sections of the Act have not been fully enforced; hence, its founding principles
are not supported. For example, the Water Fund has collected insufficient revenue to support
statutory functions.
In the theory of economics of institutions and economic growth, [42] argued that institutions
need continual adaptation in the face of changing environment of technology to promote
economic growth, particularly in Zimbabwe where there has been an emergence of new
irrigation farmers as a result of the land reform programmes. The results also reveal a weak
relationship between irrigation water law and other economic laws (mean value = 4.34) such
as environmental and energy laws, suggesting a lack of co-ordination of the laws, hence poor
irrigation water management.
The water law provided for private sector participation in irrigation water resources manage‐
ment (mean value = 5.27). This can be explained by the fact that water reforms in Zimbabwe
introduced radical changes regarding the participation and representation of users in the
management of water. The 1998 Water Act provided a legal basis for the participation of
previously excluded water users, namely communal, resettlement and small-scale commercial
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farmers. This inclusiveness has encouraged local level participation in water management at
sub-catchment council levels.
5.1.2. Policy variables
The descriptive statistics indicate that the project selection criterion was not economic-
orientated (mean value = 0.21). In Zimbabwe, challenges exist in prioritisation of the develop‐
ment of water/irrigation projects according to well defined criteria [43] based on proper
assessments of irrigation investments and projects, including their financial feasibility.
Generally, the purpose of paying for water use is to ensure sustainability of services, water
conservation, and mitigation of damages [44]. However, the results depict non-commitment
or non-payment of user fees (mean value = 0.38). Even the creation of the Water Fund embed‐
ded in the 1998 Water Act with the objectives of collecting levies, fees, government contribu‐
tions and other support towards water service provision did not help as financial inflows have
been minimal [45]. Similarly, new users are reluctant to pay for water use as water rights had
not been paid previously. There is not a culture of paying for commercial use of water by water
users [43]. Moreover, many farmers stopped paying for irrigation water after their farms were
invaded during the FTLRP [44]. In addition, most farmers in Zimbabwe have refused to pay
for water use, arguing that water is a natural resource that comes from “God”, and even if they
pay, the revenue is not re-invested back into their schemes. In response, many governments
have moved away from imposing the full costs upon water users of irrigation for political
reasons because farmers resist charges [45].
The findings reveal that payment of water was done on a partial recovery basis (mean = 1.36).
This could emanate from political interference in pricing of water in Zimbabwe where
politicians, in a bid to retain popularity, aim to keep the price of water as low as possible [43].
Even if users pay for irrigation water, a challenge lies on ensuring that at least part of the water
revenue is re-invested in water management so as to improve and make the irrigation water
policy an effective tool in irrigation water management [43].
As revealed by the results, the new irrigation policy did not fully provide for private sector
participation (mean value = 3.15). After FTLRP, challenges existed in determining respective
roles of the private and public sectors in irrigation [43]. The existing gap in roles played by the
private and public sectors negatively affect irrigation water management objectives. Moreover,
the results indicate poor participation of the private sector in water management issues (mean
value = 3.27). As such, the irrigation water policy should provide for effective private sector
participation on water management issues.
User groups, or Water Users Associations (WUAs), can play a crucial role in the management
of irrigation water resources as most people feel a stronger sense of identity and belongingness.
However, the results indicate that fewer farmers are organised into water user groups (mean
value -0.32). This could be explained by the fact that it is difficult to identify and classify water
user groups from which the representatives are chosen to constitute the sub-catchment. This
is basically the challenge in spite of the 1998 Water Act provisions. For instance, the Water Act
actually provided for the involvement of the farmers at communal level, however, the
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committees that are constituted at a local level hardly function and barely get recognition at
catchment council meetings.
The current water policy lacks clear user participation provisions (mean value = 3.65). Re‐
gardless of the 1998 Water Act having the provisions for involvement and active representation
of water users, the law has been overwhelmed by challenges. A good example is a case where
new water users who lack financial resources to travel and attend sub-catchment council
meetings, thus inhibiting them to attend the important meetings. In addition, the farmers
indicate that other economic policies have an impact on the irrigation water policy (mean value
= 6.52). Thus, water policy should clearly define how other policies are related with regards to
water management objectives.
A weak relationship is revealed between water policy and water law (mean value = 2.02). After
the FTLRP, no water law and/or policy reforms were put in place to address the needs of the
new farmers introduced by the FTLRP. Irrigation water policy should link with the irrigation
water law, so that the two work together in the management of irrigation water resources.
5.1.3. Administration variables
The surveyed farmers indicate the existence of capacity to manage irrigation water resources
management (mean value = 6.61), in the form of users’ associations, irrigation scheme consti‐
tutions, etc. Farmers indicate that water users groups or WUAs are fairly effective in ensuring
effective management of water resources (mean value = 4.73). However, [46] revealed that
irrigation schemes were poorly managed due to a lack of well-established organisational and
institutional conditions and WUAs were not well organised. In addition, as noted by [36],
Irrigation Management Committees formed to improve coordination between irrigators and
water management have not been able to take over the management of schemes because of
state-applied technical measures.
As revealed by the surveyed farmers, private sector participation presents an opportunity to
reduce the burden on irrigation water management (mean value = 5.15). Effective participation
can be achieved if supported by administrative issues that accommodate water user groups.
Water administration can ensure active participation of private sector in irrigation water
resources by creating an active role for the private sector players and by reducing the burden
on irrigation water management.
The survey reveals a lack of updates and maintenance mechanisms (mean value = 0.23). When
irrigation systems dilapidate, it can lead to poor irrigation water management, for example,
through water loss in case of burst pipes. Constant and regular monitoring of irrigation systems
is needed. Irrigation schemes need mechanisms of collecting irrigation water updates and
doing maintenance of irrigation water. However, where updates and maintenance schedules
exist, farmers have indicated they are not adequate, relevant and/or reliable. Lastly a disparity
between water administration issues and the water law and policy is revealed (mean value =
3.16). The disparities or lack of co-ordination among the formal institutions affect the effec‐
tiveness of water administration to manage water resources.
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5.2. Informal institutions
The evolution of institutions and their performance implications are affected strongly by their
path-dependency2 nature. Because of their path-dependent characteristics, institutions are the
‘carriers of history, ’ reproducing themselves well beyond the time of their usefulness [47, 48].
Since informal institutions play an important role in the incremental way in which institutions
evolve, they remain a major source of path dependence [18]. In addition to informal institu‐
tions, there are such self-reinforcing mechanisms as network externalities, learning effects, and
the historically derived subjective modelling of issues. Since all these mechanisms reinforce
the current course of the development path, reversing the course of that path becomes
extremely difficult or costly [18]. This is also reiterated in the utility of social theory to address
human problems [49], and is concerned with explaining how to improve economic perform‐
ance, and hence welfare, by comprehending human incentives, preferences, perceptions,
beliefs and learning [49]. Table 3 presents the perceptional-based informal irrigation water
institutions and performance variables.
As revealed by the CPR studies, it is difficult to implant uniform institutional arrangements
from locality to locality and situation to situation as the challenges that they face vary de‐
pending on physical and community conditions [50]. While effective institutional arrange‐
ments may deviate across settings, the CPR studies have identified common ideologies of long-
enduring and self-governed CPR institutions. According to [7, 51], the first design principle
associated with sustainable CPR governance institutions is the establishment of clearly
delineated boundaries around the resource and resource users.
A mean value of 0.314 was revealed, suggesting clearly defined boundaries to withdraw
irrigation water from CPRs clear boundaries not exist. This implies that any benefits the
communities produce, by their efforts, will be gained by the other users who would not have
contributed to the cause. [7]. However, [52] argues that there is a finite amount of water that
must be shared in common over a variety of uses and over geographic areas, based on the fact
that water falls in the form of rain, flows and evaporates with no regard to any boundary.
In addition, some CPR studies have identified general principles of long-enduring, self-
governed CPR institutions by establishment of clearly delineated boundaries around the
resource and resource users [7, 51]. It is therefore important that informal institutions be
structured in a way that will ensure CPRs users coordinate their actions to solve supply and
demand dilemmas [7, 50, 53, 54]. However, [7, 51, 55] highlights that CPRs exhibit varying
degrees of two key characteristics, one of which is the difficulty in excluding users, as such; it
will be difficult to exclude other users from accessing water resources, thus leading to free-
riding problems or insufficient maintenance of water resources. Nonetheless, there should be
effective conditions in place to ensure that water, as a CPR is effectively managed through the
use of informal rules.
The informal local rules that are formulated are participatory, implying that the behaviour of
all the users in the community or locality must customarily live in harmony with them. In
2 Path dependency means that history does matter: the direction and scope of institutional change cannot be divorced
from its early course or past history.
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addition, they are rules that govern human behaviour usually at no cost and they basically are
enforced by the locals themselves [35]. In some cases, local rights could also be sensitive to the
vulnerable, e.g. widows and the poor. Customary local practices and structures can also
contain or help avoid conflict. A mean value of 0.421 was revealed, suggesting a lack of such-
or fewer local rules. The FTLRP ushered in new water users who needed time to establish their
own local rules, given that they take time to evolve. Violations of rules and water use may go
unnoticed and unpunished. Existence of informal rules based on local condition means that if
the informal codes are violated, punishment may be enforced [7]. On the other hand, however,
[56] warns on viewing any particular institutional arrangement as a panacea for solving natural
resources (especially CPRs) problems due to heterogeneity and complexity of problems facing
different resources, hence, the need for local-based institutions. The local institutions at
interplay within a local community regulate the users who have access to the CPRs, the
resource units that the authorised participants can make use of at any given time, including
who will monitor and administer the rules [55].
Regulation and governing mechanisms, e.g. constitutions at scheme level assist in the man‐
agement of irrigation water resources. A mean value of 0.204 suggests a lack of these man‐
agement mechanisms. A study by [57] revealed that often, there was no consensus on rules
among farmers and monitoring and management mechanisms were absent. The new benefi‐
ciary farmers of the FTLRP were still not aware of the importance of informal management
mechanisms. Thus, it is important to ensure the new farmers understand the importance of
informal management mechanisms at scheme levels to promote effective irrigation water
management. Where informal management mechanisms existed, their effectiveness was
crucial to ensure efficient management of water resources. A mean value of 4.184 suggested
that these mechanisms were not effective enough. The FTLRP beneficiaries did not have
management mechanisms and had not organised themselves into user groups, where they
would formulate some management mechanism.
Effectiveness of management mechanisms depends on factors like effectiveness of monitoring
conditions, behaviour of appropriators, regulation sanctions, etc. A mean value of 3.881
suggests that monitoring conditions were not effective enough to assist in the management of
water. Therefore, there is need to ensure the effective monitoring conditions and the behav‐
iours of the appropriators to ensure all users behave accordingly and promote sustainable
water management.
Existence of regulation sanctions can be an effective mechanism of irrigation water manage‐
ment as users who rebel, default and/or fail to behave accordingly can be possibly punished.
A mean value of 0.508 was revealed, suggesting some existing regulation sanctions at some
schemes. However, existence of regulation sanctions does not denote effective irrigation water
management, unless they are effective. It is therefore important to ensure effective local
regulation sanctions to ensure irrigation water management issues.
In addition to existence of regulation the sanctions, rapid access mechanisms to conflict solving
without following long procedures or protocols can effective in the management of water
resources. A mean value of 0.381 suggests non-existence of rapid conflict conflict-solving
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mechanisms. Lack of rapid conflict-solving mechanisms in a low-cost and local setting could
have an adverse effect on irrigation water management. This encourages local users to by-pass
traditional mechanisms in hope of achieving a winner-takes-all decision [35]. However, formal
courts seem to have tendencies to overturn informal court decisions, in turn, may exacerbate
conflict at local level rather than resolve it. In addition, these channels maybe costly and users
may not be able to afford the expensive and lengthy procedures to solve conflicts, as such, may
leave some of the conflicts unsolved and this negatively impacts on irrigation water manage‐
ment objectives.
According to the transaction cost theory, functioning of institutions depends on the costliness
of enforcement [18]. Users need to create their own cheap set of rules that govern how they
manage local water resources. Users will have confidence in their own rules and thus effec‐
tively implement them to ensure users behave accordingly. Development and creation of
institutions or rules aid to creating more socially acceptable (and so economically acceptable)
outcomes [58]. In addition, informal rules also differ from community to community, hence,
the need of local, low-cost set of rules for water users. A mean value of 0.215 was revealed,
suggesting that users were not in a position to create their own set of rules to govern water
management. Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient;
rather, they are created to serve interests of those with bargaining power to create new rules
[59]. Furthermore, creation of institutions that so structure the rules and their enforcement as
to alter pay-offs induces the cooperative solutions.
Ability to challenge the rights of appropriators to create own institution based on local set-ups
promotes effective water management, and depends on the extent of challenge. A mean value
of 3.587 suggested the extent of challenging the appropriators’ rights was low. Users were
weak in challenging the rights of appropriators. As such, users could not create their own
effective set of rapid, low cost and locally-based informal institutions. As such, users need to
be empowered in creating their own set of rules.
As discussed in section 2.2, pro-informal arrangements scholars are not pushy to support the
enforcement of informal institutions, rather opting for combining the new formal and existing
informal arrangements in water management. As such, overall relationship and influence of
the informal institutions and the formal irrigation institutions becomes important as the former
guide the day-to-day management of water resources, yet, the latter tend to over-rule the
informal rules. If the formal irrigation institutions are used to govern water management,
farmers still have their own set of rules which determine their behaviour in a given context. A
mean value of 4.499 suggested a lack of influence of the informal institutions on the formal
institutions manage irrigation water management. Nonetheless, the formal institutions draw
heavily from the informal institution [59]. Lack of coherence between the informal and formal
institutions potentially leads to ineffective water resources management. In addition, users
also originate from diverse social communities where a set of rules vary, as such, the formal
rules structures should thus consider these differences to achieve irrigation water management
objectives.
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6. Empirical analysis results
This section presents the empirical results as shown in Table 10 -11.
Independent / explanatory variables Acronyms RangeCoefficient t-ratio
Access to water rights LAWR 0.151** 2.177
Format of water rights LFWR 0.083*** 1.843
Existence of irrigation water law LEWL 0.728* 2.683
Provisions effective for solving conflicts among
irrigation water users LCRM 0.475*** 1.617
Water law relevant for users under current and
future situation LRCF -0.069 -1.189
Water law relationship with other laws to
promote water management LLOL 0.418 1.238
Water law provisions to promote private sector
participation LSPS 0.208* 3.491
Constant 1.641* 3.019
R2 0.681
Chi-square (χ2) 76.521
Breusch-Pagan 63.147
*Significant at 1% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 10%
(a)
Independent / explanatory variables Acronyms RangeCoefficient t-ratio
Project selection criterion is economic orientated PPSC 0.098*** 1.653
Pay for use of irrigation water PUIW -0.079*** -1.683
Form in which irrigation water is paid for PFIP 0.237 1.107
Provisions for promoting private sector
participation PGPP 0.091*** 1.714
Extensiveness of private sector participation in
irrigation PEPP 0.087 0.839
Organised into Water Users ‘Associations
(WUAs) PWUA 0.657* 3.218
Extensiveness of WUAs ‘participation in
irrigation water management PEWA -0.181*** -1.650
Provisions favourable for users’ participation in
irrigation PGUP 0.128** 2.052
Effect of other policies like fiscal policies in
water management PEOP -0.121*** -1.645
Water policy links well with water law PWPL 0.201* 3.631
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Independent / explanatory variables Acronyms RangeCoefficient t-ratio
Constant 0.918** 2.241
R2 0.702
Chi-square (χ2) 78.023
Breusch-Pagan 64.818
*Significant at 1% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 10%
(b)
Independent / explanatory variables Acronyms RangeCoefficient t-ratio
Capacity of the administration of irrigation
water at scheme level ACIW 1.106* 3.886
Effectiveness of user groups / WUAs in
irrigation water administration AEWA -0.063*** -1.741
Private sector participation reduces water
management burden APPA -0.077 -0.806
Mechanisms of collecting updates and carry-out
maintenance works AMUM 0.093 0.904
Adequacy, relevant and reliability of water AARR 0.043 0.998
Capacity to effectively administer irrigation
water w.r.t law and policy ACLP -0.012 -0.363
Constant 1.248** 2.064
R2 0.791
Chi-square (χ2) 73.947
Breusch-Pagan 67.184
*Significant at 1% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 10%
(c)
Source: survey data (2012)
Table 10. (a) Empirical results on the nature of institution–performance linkages: water law institutions; (b) Empirical
results on the institution-performance linkages: water policy institutions; (c) Empirical results on the nature of
institution–performance linkages: water administration institutions
Independent / explanatory variables Acronyms
Range
Coefficient t-ratio
Clearly defined boundaries to withdraw irrigation
water from CPRs ICPR 0.167 0.388
Existing appropriation rules related to the local
conditions IARL 0.186** 2.238
Existence of mechanisms, e.g. constitutions IMSL 0.783** 2.724
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Independent / explanatory variables Acronyms
Range
Coefficient t-ratio
Effectiveness of management mechanisms in water
management IEMM 0.319* 4.543
Effectiveness of monitoring, conditions & behaviour
of appropriators IEMA -0.163*** -1.656
Existence of regulation sanctions at scheme level IERS 0.689* 4.891
Existence of rapid access to conflict-solving IECS 1.418* 2.860
Users against rights of appropriators to create local-
based institutions ICRA 0.278 1.019
Effectiveness of users against rights of appropriators IECA 0.181 1.033
Effectiveness of informal institutions on law, policy
& administration IOEI 0.127 1.203
Constant 1.613** 2.186
R2 0.817
Chi-square (χ2) 76.377
Breusch-Pagan 69.691
*Significant at 1% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 10%
Source: survey data
Table 11. Empirical results: informal institution-performance linkages
6.1. Formal institutions
6.1.1. Legal variables
A positive regression coefficient of 0.151 at the 5% significance level suggests that access to
irrigation water rights significantly strengthens the irrigation water law in the management
of water resources. Private property [39, 60] Coase, 1960), just like water rights, is the most
efficient system of land use. Similarly, North & Thomas (1977) support such an inference by
arguing that property rights provide incentives to encourage development and cultivation.
A positive relationship between the water law and the format of water rights was revealed
(regression coefficient of 0.083) at the 10% significance level. Unclear/scattered or lack of format
rights, for example, may result in the water law failing to effectively manage irrigation water
which can increase risks and transaction costs [39].
In his critique of instrumental rationality to further support the importance of institutions, [61]
argued that the human mind fails to deliberately and analytically process all available
information to choose an action that maximises utility. The study revealed that knowledge of
the existence of the water law positively and significantly strengthens the effectiveness of the
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irrigation water law (regression coefficient of 0.728) at the 1% significance level. Lack of knowl‐
edge implies individuals have incomplete information and limited capacity to process
information [59], thus it is necessary to educate farmers about the water law and its existence.
Farmers may also choose an alternative that maximises their personal preferences and make
decisions that lead to efficient outcomes [62].
The research findings reveal that if the water law provides for conflict resolution, it positively
and significantly strengthens the effectiveness of the water law in the management of water
resources. This is explained by a regression coefficient of 0.475 at the 10% significance level.
Effective conflict-solving provisions within the water law can ensure that certain protocols are
followed without bias towards the parts concerned.
A positive relationship, (regression coefficient of 0.208) at the 1% significance level implies that
provisions for private sector participation significantly strengthen the irrigation water law.
Clear provisions that allow effective private sector participation in agricultural water man‐
agement can lead to effective water management. Water law should provide for private sector
participation to be an effective institution in managing agricultural water.
6.1.2. Policy variables
The study findings revealed that the irrigation water policy is positively related to the criteria
on how irrigation projects are selected (regression coefficient of 0.098 at the 10% significance
level). This suggests that project selection criterion significantly strengthens the effectiveness
of the water policy to manage irrigation water resources. For example, if the irrigation water
policy clearly defines selection of projects based on economic growth and development
objectives, the water policy will become an efficient and effective water management institu‐
tion.
The results of this study revealed a negative relationship between the effectiveness of the
irrigation water policy and users paying for irrigation water, as shown by regression coefficient
of -0.079 at the 10% significance level. The implication is that if the irrigation water policy has
clearly specified clauses on users pay principles, then it can significantly lead to effective
irrigation water management. The negative relationship implies that failure of farmers to pay
for water use negatively affects the effectiveness of the irrigation water policy to manage
agricultural water, hence, can lead to poor irrigation water management.
There is a positive relationship between the effectiveness of the irrigation water policy and
availability of provisions promoting private sector participation (regression coefficient of
0.091) at the 10% significance level. Unfavourable provisions may discourage private sector
participation and in the long-run, may lead to ineffectiveness of the water law to manage water
resources.
Organisation of farmers into Water User Associations (WUAs) positively and significantly
strengthens the effectiveness of the irrigation water policy to manage irrigation water
(regression coefficient of 0.657) at the 1% significance level. As such, favourable clauses within
the irrigation water policy promoting and supporting users to organise themselves into users
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groups has the potential of sustaining efficient irrigation water use as WUAs may have the
opportunity to enforce the use of restricted rules and regulations.
The results revealed a negative relationship (regression coefficient of -0.181 at the 10% significance
level) between the effectiveness of the water policy and the extent to which WUAs/user groups
participate in water management. The negative relationship revealed in this study implies that
the WUAs have not been effective in irrigation water management. If the irrigation water
policy promotes organisation of the farmers into user groups and/or WUAs, and allows for
their extensive participation, it can lead to an effective and sustained irrigation water man‐
agement. In addition, a positive regression coefficient of 0.128 at the 5% significance level implies
that policy provisions that favour farmers’ participation leads to effective irrigation water
management.
The results of this study revealed a negative and significant relationship between the irrigation
water policy and its relationship with other economic policies (regression coefficient of -0.121 at
the 10% significance level). Lack of enabling policies and effective institutional frameworks are
major contributors towards poor management and utilisation of irrigation water [3]. Moreover,
the linkage between the irrigation water- policy and law revealed a positive and significant
regression coefficient of 0.201 at the 1% significance level. If the water law relates well to the water
policy, it will lead to an effective irrigation water policy that will ensure efficient and sustained
water resources management.
6.1.3. Administration variables
The results revealed a positive relationship between overall irrigation water administration
and administration capacity at scheme level (regression coefficient of 1.106) at the 1% significance
level). If administration capacity exists at irrigation schemes, it strengthens the overall
irrigation water administration as a water management institution. Thus, capacitating farmers
with administration roles, e.g. promoting organisation of farmers WUAs at scheme level can
lead to effective irrigation water management.
The results revealed a negative relationship between overall irrigation water administration
and the effectiveness of user groups or WUAs in the administration of irrigation water
(regression coefficient of -0.063 at the 10% significance level). Thus, administration conditions
should promote effectiveness of users to manage water resources. WUAs, for example can
formulate farm plans for the area, market local produce, distribute farm inputs, formulate rules
for the maintenance of irrigation infrastructure, devise procedures for the distribution of water,
and impose and collect irrigation fees (Samad, 2005). The observed negative relationship
implies that currently, water users are not effective in the management of water resources.
6.2. Informal institutions
According to [5], a series of institutional arrangements have been presented as panaceas to
improve water management: strong government agencies, user organisations, and water
markets. This is based on the fact that it is difficult to transplant institutions from one context
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to the other due to diversified and different local situations. As such, this paper also analysed
how significant some of these arrangements are with regards to irrigation water management.
Informal irrigation water institution can be an effective water management tool if local
appropriation rules related to local conditions exist. [63] argues that people will co-operate for
their common good without provision of external (state) coercion. A positive coefficient of 0.186
at the 5% level was revealed between the effectiveness of informal irrigation institution and
the existence of localised appropriation rules. An increase by one unit point in the explanatory
variable increases the effectiveness of the informal institution in managing water resources.
The significant relationship suggests that creating locally-based rules makes informal irriga‐
tion institution effective in water management. Institutions contain an element of predictability
as institutionalised rules and norms hold a certain level of stability [64]. In addition, as
institutions change, societies adjust themselves accordingly to adapt to the changes [30, 65].
Localised appropriation rules ensure that users behave according to defined rules and
regulations, failure of which punishments will be effected upon the offenders as may be
defined by the rules. However, these appropriation rules or conditions need to be strongly
monitored to promote effective water management. This has been revealed by a coefficient of
-0.163 at the 10% significance level. A one unit point increase in the explanatory variable results
in a decrease by 0.163 in the effectiveness of the informal institutions in managing irrigation
water if the local rules are not monitored effectively. This implies that the informal institutions
become effective water management institution if the created local rules are effectively
monitored. Effective rules encourage members to co-operate towards a group strategy because
they provide certainty about expected actions of others [63, 66].
Some management mechanism, e.g. constitutions, can be effective tools of implementing and
monitoring localised appropriation rules. In light of this, the analysed empirical results
revealed a positive regression coefficient 0.783 at the 5% level. The relationship implies that a
one-point increase in the explanatory variable leads to a 0.783 increase in the effectiveness of
the informal institutions in managing irrigation water through effective constitutions. Man‐
agement mechanisms ensure localised rules are effectively implemented. The relationship also
suggests that the informal rules become effective water management tools if regulation
mechanisms are existent and effective. Effectiveness of management mechanisms significantly
strengthens the effectiveness of informal rules in managing water resources. This has been
revealed by a regression coefficient of 0.319 at the 1% significance level. A one unit increase in
the effectiveness of management mechanisms increases the effectiveness of the informal
institutions by 0.319. The results suggest that the more effective the management mechanism,
the more effective the informal rules.
Effectiveness of management mechanisms can be explained by existence of regulation
sanctions. Effectiveness in internal governance is needed for the effective application of
community rules [11]. A significant relationship has been revealed between effectiveness of
informal irrigation institutions and existence of regulation sanctions, as shown by a coefficient
of 0.689 at the 1% level. Existence of regulation sanctions increases the effectiveness of the
informal institutions by 0.689 given a one unit point increase in the explanatory variable.
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Existence of regulation sanctions ensures implementation of informal rules as an effective tool
in managing water resources.
Existence of rapid access to conflict-solving in a low-cost and local setting significantly
strengthens the effectiveness of formal rules to manage water resources. A coefficient of 1.418
at the 1% significance level suggests that a one-point increase in the existence of rapid access
to conflict-solving results in a 1.148 increase in the effectiveness of the informal water institu‐
tions. This suggests that farmers simply solve their conflicts at scheme level than attempting
to follow the formal channels to courts, which may take long to solve such conflicts. However,
formal courts tend to nullify the rulings of informal arbitration [35]. This may imply perpet‐
uation of conflict, eventually leading to poor irrigation water management.
7. Conclusions
The main thrust of institutional change within the irrigation water sector is to enhance the
capabilities and increase the readiness of policymakers to solve the current and future
agricultural water resources challenges with regards to their development and management.
Given this thrust, the major goals of institutional initiatives in the water sector include: treating
water as an economic good where prices are attached to use of irrigation water; inculcating a
payment culture; and promoting effective, sustainable, decentralized decision structures.
Institutional reform of the magnitude required to achieve these goals is a daunting challenge
in Zimbabwe, particularly with the ineffective, irrelevant and poorly functioning irrigation
water institutions. The issue of how to achieve irrigation water institutional change within the
constraints and opportunities of political economy continue to remain elusive to both re‐
searchers and policymakers as most smallholder irrigation farmers still remain disadvantaged
with regards to irrigation water resources development and management.
It is important to note that institutions typically change incrementally rather than in discon‐
tinuous fashion [11]. Even if some change is anticipated by a new policy or law, it is fairly
common that the society adopts it slowly. The main reason for this incremental change is that
there are many institutional elements which are interconnected, and a change gets cushioned
by many other established institutional elements. Nonetheless, the important issue for policy
makers is to ensure recommended polices are put on the table for consideration, especially in
Zimbabwe where policy changes are imminent due to new users in the irrigation sector.
With regards to informal institutions, there were no clear boundaries to withdraw water
resources from the CPRs, compounded by lack of local appropriation rules to regulate water
management. Some management mechanisms did not exist at schemes, and where they
existed, they not effective in managing water resources. Monitoring conditions and the
behaviour of appropriators at scheme levels was not effective, owing to lack of effective
management mechanisms and regulation sanctions. Rapid conflict-solving mechanisms were
non-existent at schemes. Users had little capacity to challenge the rights of appropriators to
create own local rules and the extent to which they challenge was not effective. The informal
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institutions were not effective enough to influence how the formal institutions manage water
resources owing to the fact that the informal institutions are ignored and neglected, yet they
guide the day-to-day water management activities. They are not regarded as instruments for
effective irrigation water management, hence the lack of influence of the informal institutions
on formal institutions. Lastly, the paper also noted the role and significance of the informal
water management institutions in the effective management of water resources.
8. Policy recommendations
This research indicates that attempts to reform the water sector with the view to improve
productive uses of water in rural areas, must confront the historical legacy of inequalities of
access to land and water, which has continued under the FTLRP. One way of attaining
improvement is to promote wide-scale participation of all stakeholders in the debate about the
water reform over a long period of time. This will also entail seeking policy suggestions from
all stakeholders, particularly the poor, on how water policy can be improved. Such an approach
will break the stranglehold that government and donors have on the water policy-making
process. In addition, issuance of water permits to water users will promote sustainable and
efficient use of irrigation water resources. Water rights give farmers the sense of ownership
and sense of belonging to water user groups which provides incentive to use water in a
sustainable and efficient manner. The irrigation water law should provide clear provisions for
the issuance of water rights.
In the Zimbabwean context, this study suggests that water reform must be linked, in innovative
ways to the FTLRP, which aimed at providing access to productive land to rural people for
livelihood improvement. It is the combined access to productive land and water, that water
can be productively used to alleviate poverty and contribute to economic growth. Although
access to fertile land is crucial to productive uses of water, new water users need access to a
broad portfolio of other assets central to the productive use of water such as functioning
irrigation technology and infrastructure. A new water policy should focus the development,
provision and maintenance of relevant low-cost irrigation technology to communal farmers.
Water policy should provide greater local control of water charges. Revenue raised can be used
to fund water development projects and maintain irrigation infrastructure within communal
irrigation schemes. A policy that inculcates a culture of paying for commercial irrigation water
and ensuring water revenue is re-invested in water resources development and management
is needed along with the establishment of a water pricing structure that is consistent with cost
and social efficiency.
There is a need to strengthen WUAs so these institutions can undertake the complex tasks
of  financial  management  and technical  support  to  irrigation communities.  These capaci‐
ties are weak in most WUAs. Government can provide education to enhance local admin‐
istrative, managerial, and financial capacities of participants. Water administration should
encourage better  coordination between public-public  and public-private sectors.  In areas
where  there  is  inadequate  local  revenue,  government,  private  sector,  NGOs  and  other
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development agencies can fund water development and the functioning of decentralised
institutions  of  water  management.  There  is  need  for  information  dissemination  cam‐
paigns where the regulation of water users is undertaken.
Interventions to strengthen the capacity of the informal systems in managing water resources
should be formulated and implemented effectively. This is because the formal institutions
draw heavily from the informal institutions if they are to effectively work. Some local ar‐
rangements such as one-to-one conflict resolution mechanisms are more efficient, more cost-
effective, longer-lasting and more widely accepted among local water users than most top-
down state-driven institutions. When considering formal state-based institutions, water users
should not think that they are a panacea to all water management challenges. In this regard,
local informal water institutions should not be discarded as primitive and obsolete tools. Local
water management arrangements need to be given time to evolve, with limited interference
from external agencies, as they seek to address emerging water management imperatives
especially in an environment that has been overwhelmed by new users in the irrigation sector.
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